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The prudent carries a revolver,
He bolts the door,
O’erlooking a superior spectre
More near.
Emily Dickinson, 1862
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It is worth remembering that the main reason everybody—really, just about 
everybody—is fascinated with, and troubled by, work in cognitive science is that 
it so manifestly promises or threatens to introduce alien substitutes for the everyday 
terms in which we conduct our moral lives.
(Dennett, 2009, p. 235; original emphasis)
1. The Dual Brain
At least twice so far—first in the nineteenth century and then again in the twentieth—
debates about our nature and identities as embodied psychological beings have taken 
as a primary source of puzzlement and inspiration what may be the most readily visible 
fact about the human brain: its dual structure.
Like our limbs and faces, but unlike many of our internal organs, our central nervous 
systems are bilaterally symmetric: they look the same on the right as on the left, at least 
with respect to their gross morphology, that is, their large-scale shapes and structures, 
visible without magnification. Most of the structures that make up the brain are paired, 
again just like our eyes and ears and arms: there is a caudate nucleus on the left and a 
caudate nucleus on the right, a left cerebellar peduncle and a right cerebellar peduncle, 
and so on. As one would expect, these paired structures are in general roughly symmetric 
in function: there is a left cortical visual system and a right cortical visual system, a left 
thalamic relay system and a right thalamic relay system, and so on.
The duality of the brain is nowhere more evident than at the cortical level, since the 
cortex is both the most outward-lying and the largest portion of the cerebrum, itself 
the most outward-lying and largest portion of the brain. Its size is one reason that for 
so long “higher” cognitive functions (self-awareness, reason, language, moral sensitivity) 
were believed to be basically cortical phenomena. These were the capacities that 
supposedly made human beings unique among animals, and the cortex was known to 
be unusually large in us, relative both to the size of our bodies and to the rest of the 
human brain. (Its relative size has since come to be seen as less psychologically and 
evolutionarily significant; see Herculano-Houzel, 2009.) And the unusually large cortex 
of the human brain is visibly doubled—that, or divided—into two half-globes of gray 
convolutions: the right cerebral hemisphere and the left cerebral hemisphere—the 
“great” cerebral hemispheres, as they were sometimes called.
1
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2 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND “SPLIT” BRAINS
The duality of the brain was what led the seventeenth-century mathematician, 
philosopher, and natural scientist René Descartes to propose that the point of inter-
change between the mind and its material organ might be the pineal gland, one of 
the few unpaired structures in the brain and thus one of the few that seemed a viable 
candidate for interacting with the essentially unified mind (see Shapiro, 2011, for 
 discussion). In a fascinating scientific and intellectual history, Harrington (1987) 
notes that a number of nineteenth-century thinkers argued that the duality of the brain 
undermined the materialist view of the mind (for a neuropsychologist’s perspective 
on the same history, see Bogen, 1969, 1979). Their reasoning was simple: the brain is 
dual, so if the mind were the brain, the mind would be dual too, but in fact the mind 
is unitary, so the mind is not the brain.
Materialists did not respond to this argument in one voice. One option was to accept 
the first two premises of the anti-materialist’s argument: the brain is dual, so if the 
mind is the brain, then the mind is dual, too. Wedded with materialism, the conclusion 
is that each brain is the seat of two minds, a right hemisphere mind and a left. Wigan 
(1844) defended just this position in his provocatively titled tome, The Duality of Mind: 
Proved by the Structure, Function, and Diseases of the Brain and by the Phenomena of 
Mental Derangement and Shown to Be Essential to Moral Responsibility.
Wigan’s was an argument for universal mental duality: each of us has two minds 
apiece. As his title makes clear, Wigan did not appeal solely to neuroanatomical 
considerations. Among other things, he was much impressed by case reports of persons 
who had lost almost an entire cerebral hemisphere and still carried on reasonably well. 
No one could carry on reasonably well after losing half a mind—whatever that would 
even mean. What, then, are we to conclude, but that a brain is ordinarily the site of two 
minds? Once proposed, the dual mind hypothesis seemed poised to explain so much: 
there was evidence almost everywhere, in robust mental faculties and psychic instability 
alike. Over the course of the next century, the notion that we all have two minds or, 
better, two selves, would be used, in some hands, to explain everything from hypnosis 
to homosexuality.
Most of Wigan’s materialist contemporaries did not accept his conclusion, however, 
but instead rejected one of the anti-materialist’s premises. The mind is unified, they 
said, because the brain itself is unified, via the great white band of fibers that visibly 
connect the two cerebral hemispheres (see Figure 1.1).
Different structures and areas of the brain are connected by white matter tracts. 
Some of these pathways are physically direct, running from one structure to another 
without passing through and synapsing at an intermediate third. Others are quite 
indirect. Structures on opposite sides of the brain are connected via white matter 
pathways that themselves cross the midline of the brain. Some of these crossings occur 
via decussations, crossing the midline while ascending or descending to another level. 
Others are commissures, crossing the midline without ascent or descent, and generally 
connecting homologous (equivalent) structures. The corpus callosum is the largest of 
these commissures. It is in fact the largest fiber tract in the human brain.
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The corpus callosum connects mostly homologous areas of the cerebral hemispheres. 
It is readily visible to the naked eye and made some impression upon nineteenth-
century materialists and anti-materialists alike (see e.g. Holland, 1852, p. 175). The 
great nineteenth-century psychologist Gustav Fechner was led to predict that if this 
commissure were cut, then the human soul or self would itself become two, in the same 
way that a worm, cut in half, simply becomes two living organisms (1860, p. 537). As 
Corballis notes, this hypothesis “is essentially a mechanistic one: dividing the brain 
should also divide the mind” (Corballis, 1998, p. 1084).
That one worm becomes two living beings when cut had struck Augustine as well: 
could souls be so divisible? (Augustine, 1947, pp. 128–9.) But worms are a special case; 
you can’t double a herd by vivisection. Who is to say that you could divide the brain 
without destroying thought and consciousness altogether?
There were reported instances in which the corpus callosum had been partially 
destroyed by organic causes, that is, by illness or injury, and while in some cases this 
damage was accompanied by “psychic dysfunction,” there were also a “disturbing 
number” of cases that seemed to show the opposite (Harrington, 1985, p. 627). Organic 
Figure 1.1 The corpus callosum. The arrow indicates the corpus callosum in a coronal section 
of the brain.
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4 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND “SPLIT” BRAINS
brain injury makes for messy evidence, though—especially at the time, since neither 
the location nor the extent of the damage could be confidently determined until 
postmortem autopsy, however many years later. It was also possible to section the 
corpus callosum in non-human animals for purely experimental purposes, but they 
couldn’t speak, making their mental lives relatively opaque to the theorist, and anyway, 
their minds might simply be different, more material than ours, somehow.
What was really needed to settle the matter was a controlled surgery on a sane and 
intelligent person.
At least one man offered to make the ultimate sacrifice for human understanding 
(and for his own long-standing scholarly defense of anti-materialism): the British 
psychologist William McDougall, author of the expansive and impassioned tract Body 
and Mind (1911), who
tried to bargain with Sherrington . . . that if he should ever be smitten with an incurable disease, 
Sherrington should cut through his corpus callosum . . . “If I am right,” he said, “my consciousness 
will remain a unitary consciousness.” And he seemed to regard that as the most convincing 
[possible] proof of the existence of something like a soul. (quoted in Zangwill, 1974, p. 265)
No one took McDougall up on his offer, however; then as now, there was a great 
reluctance to cut open a living person just to settle a metaphysical bet. The great 
commissure connecting the great cerebral hemispheres would not be deliberately 
destroyed by a surgeon’s knife short of medical necessity.
2. The Split-Brain Surgeries
Epilepsy is a chronic condition characterized by recurring seizures that have no 
other known cause. A seizure is a sudden excess of electrical activity, like a short circuit 
in the brain. When the disruption is confined to a localized area, it is called a focal 
seizure. In a generalized seizure, the activity spreads.
A tonic-clonic seizure is a generalized seizure. In the first phase the body clenches, 
becomes rigid. In the second phase it begins to jerk violently. Epilepsy characterized 
by this type of seizure was classically called grand mal—French for “great illness.” 
A person experiencing a grand mal seizure may lose consciousness. She may be 
halfway across a busy intersection when it happens. She may only have a few seconds 
of warning, one that comes in the form of an aura: a visual disturbance, an auditory or 
olfactory hallucination, a feeling of numbness or tingling on one side of her face, or a 
wave of nausea, anxiety, or fear.
Seizures most often originate within a single hemisphere, but in a grand mal seizure 
this electrical wildfire quickly spreads to the other side, too. The corpus callosum 
physically bridges the two hemispheres. What if this was how the seizures crossed? 
And then what if you destroyed the bridge? Sparing even a single hemisphere from 
seizures might at least allow patients to retain consciousness during the episode, to 
avoid collapsing where they were.
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2.1. The first split-brain surgeries
The first human beings to receive “split-brain” surgeries will not receive much atten-
tion in this book. They didn’t receive much attention at the time, either.
I call them “pre-modern” split-brain subjects because we don’t have their complete 
history. According to some reports, we don’t even know how many of them there were: 
one epilepsy researcher first capped the number of such surgeries at twenty-seven and 
later clarified (or revised) this to mean that there had been twenty-seven done at least 
in one particular year (Williamson, 1985, 1995). Akelaitis (1945), writing at the time 
they were performed, reported thirty such surgeries while citing a paper (van Wagenen 
and Herren, 1940) that mentions only ten. Careful analysis of all the papers concerning 
this first set of split-brain surgeries led Bogen (1995) to believe that there were thirty-
four callosal surgeries but on only twenty-eight patients.
The surgeon was Dr. van Wagenen. Years later, the sitting Chief of Neurosurgery at the 
University of Rochester would mention in a letter to another neuropsychologist, Joseph 
Bogen, that “Dr. Van Wagenen always was sorry about what he did to those patients” 
(cited in Bogen, 2000, p. 93). Certainly, the surgery didn’t catch on, though the results van 
Wagenen himself reported appear to have been fairly positive: the patients suffered some 
irritating new symptoms, but also enjoyed some relief from their far-beyond-irritating 
seizures. They were extensively examined post-operatively by Akelaitis and colleagues, 
who published a short series of papers presenting the findings of their investigations into 
the psychobehavioral consequences of callosal section.
They found very little (Akelaitis, 1941). Putting a positive spin on his anti-climactic 
conclusions, Akelaitis wrote only that “evidence has been presented showing that 
interhemispheric neuronal pathways exist other than those found in the corpus callosum 
and anterior commissure” (1944, p. 101). No candidate pathways were proposed.
And that, presumably, was that: as van Wagenen himself said (van Wagenen and 
Herren, 1940, p. 741), so much for the “hallowed ground” of the corpus callosum as the 
“seat of the soul”! In fact, by the mid twentieth century the functional insignificance 
of the corpus callosum was arguably “common knowledge” (see e.g. Fessard, 1954). 
As one neurophysiologist joked, “I have laughingly said that, so far as I can see . . . the 
only demonstrable function of the corpus callosum, [is] to spread seizures from one 
side to the other” (McCulloch, 1949, p. 21).
2.2. The discovery of the split-brain phenomenon
In retrospect, it seems likely that van Wagenen’s surgeries did not fully section the 
corpus callosum, which would partially explain Akelaitis’s negative results. On the other 
hand, Akelaitis’s findings were not entirely negative; he did, for instance, mention 
one “remarkable type of behavior which has not [yet] been described in patients with 
callosal lesions as far as I can discover. It consists of an apparent conflict between 
the desired act and the actually performed act” (1945, p. 594). For that matter, van 
Wagenen himself commented upon a patient who, after surgery, briefly began referring 
to herself in the third person (van Wagenen and Herren, 1940).
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No systematic behavioral consequences of callosal section were revealed by clinical 
testing, however (van Wagenen and Herren, 1940; Akelaitis, 1944), and this was partly 
due to the testing methods themselves.
Akelaitis was a neurologist, trained to discern behavioral signs of mental disorder or 
impairment following brain injury. He looked for the signs that neuropsychologists 
still consider hallmarks of the callosal disconnection syndrome: impaired stereognosis 
(impaired capacity to recognize objects by touch), apraxia (difficulty with motor 
planning), and anomic aphasia (impaired ability to retrieve the words for things). The 
right way of looking for these signs in this particular patient population, however, 
had not yet been developed. In fact, you would never think to look in what turned 
out to be the right way unless you came armed with a specific hypothesis about 
what you might find:
Experienced split-brain experimenters are often surprised when noted and unquestionably 
competent neuropsychologists . . . show themselves initially unequal to the task of testing the 
commissurotomy patient. The chronic disconnection syndrome is dramatic, widely known, 
and readily explicable. However, the arsenal developed to assess it is complex, sometimes 
subtle, and often based on implicit assumptions. (Zaidel et al., 1990, p. 147)
Developing and employing this “arsenal” requires an unusual conceptual shift, one 
that is illustrated by the first “proto” split-brain experiment ever performed on a 
human being. The man was Bill Jenkins, the first of the “modern” split-brain subjects, 
who underwent commissurotomy at the hands of Dr. Vogel in 1962. Not least because 
Jenkins was the first person to undergo split-brain surgery in about twenty years, 
Vogel’s colleague Joseph Bogen was eager to run formal tests of the patient’s cogni-
tive abilities following the operation, and Jenkins was apparently “eager” to oblige 
(Bogen, 2006, p. 93).
Bogen writes, “Vogel shrugged off the idea. I supposed it was a result of his having 
learned surgery at a time when, if a brain-operated patient left the hospital speaking 
sensibly and walking without assistance, the operation was a success” (2006, p. 93). 
Even Roger W. Sperry, who had already been investigating the psychobehavioral con-
sequences of split-brain surgeries in non-human animals, “shrugged: what theoretical 
preconception would be falsified?” (Bogen, 2006, p. 93). But a graduate student of 
Sperry’s named Michael Gazzaniga was also interested, and he and Bogen eventually 
found a psychologist to help them administer to Bill a variety of tests measuring differ-
ent aspects of intelligence.
Dr. Edwards had experience testing clinical patients, but unlike Bogen and Gazzaniga, 
he did not know of the split-brain animal experiments (see Section 2.4) and did not 
enter the room armed with a hypothesis about the psychological significance of the 
corpus callosum. Careful clinical testing of a split-brain subject thus once again threat-
ened to turn up nothing of interest, until Dr. Edwards began to administer the Block 
Design Subtest.
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The Block Design Subtest is first and foremost a test of visuospatial reasoning. The 
subject is given a collection of colored blocks and asked to arrange them to match a 
sample geometrical pattern. At first:
Bill [Jenkins] pushed the blocks around somewhat ineffectually. Meanwhile Edwards was 
timing in his usual fashion and ended up [giving Bill] a zero score. I suggested that he [Bill] use 
one hand at a time. Dr. Edwards objected because it was customary for subjects to use both 
hands. However, he was persuaded to try this momentarily, so we asked Bill to use only his 
right hand while sitting on his left hand. Then we asked him to do it with [only] his left hand. He 
had considerable success. Mike [Gazzaniga] and I looked at each other as if we had caught a 
glimpse of the Holy Grail. “Now try it with just your left hand,” I asked. He was quite successful! 
“Now try the next pattern.” With his left hand he did the next one quite quickly.
“No!” Edwards said, “He is supposed to use both hands.” It was getting a little tense, because 
he insisted on doing it the standard way and we were anxious to further pursue our Grail. 
Dr. Edwards quietly prevailed and he finished the tests. We thanked him, and he replied, “Yes, 
it was interesting. We should test 20 or 30 more of these patients with various lesions.” . . . We 
realized Edwards was in the dark as to what had happened and what sort of patient Bill was, or 
why we were so wreathed in smiles. (Bogen, 2006, p. 93; emphasis added)
Dr. Edwards saw no rationale for instructing the patient to use only one hand. He was 
trying to test the visuospatial abilities of Bill Jenkins, and Bill Jenkins had two hands. 
Joseph Bogen and Michael Gazzaniga were trying to test the visuospatial abilities of 
Bill Jenkins’s right hemisphere. And the right hemisphere enjoys greater control of the 
left hand, specifically.
With Bill Jenkins, split-brain surgery was revived as a treatment for severe cases of 
epilepsy in the second half of the twentieth century. The split-brain subjects I will focus 
on in this book belong to three different patient groups. The first group (including Bill 
Jenkins) was operated upon by Dr. Vogel in the 1960s (the “West Coast series”); the 
second group was operated upon by Dr. Rayport (the “Midwest series”); the third and 
largest group was operated upon by Dr. Wilson in the 1970s (the “East Coast series”).
There were substantial differences between the surgeries both within and across 
groups. Patients in the West Coast series underwent cerebral commissurotomy. This 
surgery sections the cortical or cerebral commissures: the corpus callosum, the anter-
ior commissure, the posterior commissure, the hippocampal commissure. Patients 
from the Midwest series underwent full callosotomy, which sections the entirety of 
the corpus callosum (and also the hippocampal commissure; see Gazzaniga, 2000, 
p. 1311) but leaves intact the anterior and posterior commissures. Patients from the later 
East Coast series underwent either full callosotomy or only partial callosotomy, since it 
was discovered that in many patients, significant seizure reduction with fewer side 
effects could be achieved by a surgery that left intact not only the anterior commissure 
but also the posterior portion of the corpus callosum (the splenium). Adults in the 
United States now undergo at most partial callosotomy, although full callosotomy is 
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sometimes still performed on children in the United States and on adults elsewhere in 
the world. I will refer to human beings who underwent either commissurotomy or full 
callosotomy as split-brain subjects.
The term “subject” is meant to be as neutral as possible on all philosophical questions 
of personal identity. I’m using it, as Rupert says, with a nod to “the dry language of 
methodology sections . . . [in which] ‘subject’ means little more than ‘warm body that 
can be reidentified over time’ ” (Rupert, 2009, p. 51). The term “split-brain patient” is 
more often used, but split-brain experiments are not medical treatment; the split-brain 
men and women we know much about are those who generously agreed to act as 
participants in ongoing scientific research into the psychological consequences of 
“splitting” the brain. I’ll generally use the present tense to refer to them, though by 
now, many of them are deceased.
In light of the sheer size of the corpus callosum, it isn’t surprising that its removal 
should produce the acute callosal disconnection syndrome, lasting days or weeks or 
months. Immediately after surgery, a split-brain subject may be entirely mute, then 
incapable of spontaneous speech, and lastly incapable of obeying verbal commands 
using her left hand. Or she may have trouble using her two hands cooperatively. Or she 
may say that she cannot control her left hand, that it won’t do what she wants or that 
it does what she doesn’t want. Still, she knows that the hand is hers (that is, she isn’t 
delusional) and she is fully aware of her impairments (that is, she isn’t anosognosic). 
Once the acute phase of the syndrome has passed, the subjects generally report that 
they are doing well, and their friends and family agree. Improvements in their medical 
condition usually outweigh the seriousness of any new, post-surgical difficulties.
Most of these difficulties are not immediately striking: a diminishment of emotional 
expressivity in speech, some memory loss around the edges. The only striking sign that 
subjects often complain of is some ongoing “trouble with the left hand”: the left hand 
begins unbuttoning the shirt the subject is attempting to button, or the left hand pushes 
away the paper the subject is trying to read or grabs items from the supermarket shelf 
that the subject has no intention of purchasing.
On the face of it, these signs constitute a motley crew. The systematic psychic conse-
quences of split-brain surgery emerge clearly only under experimental conditions.
2.3. The first split-brain experiments
Split-brain experiments have two paradigmatic features. Their basic rationale is to 
allow experimenters to interact with each hemisphere independently.
The first feature of the split-brain experimental paradigm is stimulus lateralization: 
sensory-perceptual information is carefully directed to only a single hemisphere at a 
time, to the extent possible. This feature exploits the fact that the two hemispheres are 
not totally symmetric with respect to their access to incoming sensory-perceptual 
information. In the realm of tactile perception (fine-grained touch, as could be used to 
identify an object by feeling it), each hemisphere receives information from only the 
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contralateral, that is, opposite-side hand: left hemisphere (LH) from right hand, right 
hemisphere (RH) from left hand. In the realm of olfaction, each hemisphere receives 
olfactory information from mainly the ipsilateral, that is, same-side, nostril: if you 
hold a rose before a split-brain subject’s nose after sealing her right nostril, leaving 
only her left nostril open, olfactory information about the rose will be sent to only her 
LH. Each hemisphere receives auditory information from both ears, but more strongly 
from the contralateral ear (that is, RH from the left ear, LH from the right ear); if you 
simultaneously present to the two ears different complex auditory stimuli—such as a 
different stream of speech to each ear—each stream will be suppressed in the ipsilateral 
(same-side) hemisphere, which will consciously process only the speech from the 
contralateral ear. And there are similar stories to tell for perceptual information 
from other modalities, which can be lateralized differently and to different degrees 
in each case.
The second feature of the split-brain experimental paradigm is response lateraliza-
tion: split-brain subjects are directed to respond to stimuli or requests either vocally or 
using a specific hand. This feature exploits the fact that the two hemispheres are not 
totally symmetric with respect to the control of movement. Each hemisphere exerts 
dominant motor control over the contralateral hand, so that the left hand is especially 
controlled by the RH and the right hand is especially controlled by the LH. In subjects 
in whom the left hemisphere is the so-called dominant hemisphere—which is most 
subjects—the left hemisphere is dominant for spoken language and for many (though 
not all) linguistic functions; indeed, split-brain subjects often cannot generate speech 
out of their right hemispheres at all.
The first successful split-brain experiments were performed on cats and monkeys 
(see e.g. Myers, 1956; Myers and Sperry, 1953; Sperry et al., 1956; Sperry, 1958). This 
was only after a considerable period of unsuccessful attempts. For more than a decade 
prior, callosotomy had been performed on non-human animals for experimental pur-
poses and yet those animals hadn’t seemed much changed after recovering from the 
trauma of the surgery itself: they could still see, walk, eat, learn from experience.
These first experimental callosotomies had left intact the optic chiasm: a midline 
crossing (a decussation) at which some axons from the right optic nerve pass over to 
the left to join the left optic tract while some axons from the left optic nerve pass over 
to the right to join the right optic tract (see Figure 1.2). The optic chiasm had also 
been experimentally sectioned in non-human animals, but in those animals the corpus 
callosum had been left intact. Following either kind of surgery, animals trained to 
make a perceptual discrimination using only one eye (the second eye forcibly closed) 
could nonetheless, as soon as given the opportunity, perform it perfectly using only the 
other eye (the first eye now forcibly closed). In other words, there was no evidence that 
such surgery disrupted or divided the unity of perceptual experience, learning, or action. 
However, as Morgan and Stellar noted (1943, pp. 449–50), no one had yet sectioned 
both the corpus callosum and the optic chiasm in one animal.
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Figure 1.2 Primary visual pathways to the hemispheres. A subject’s visual field is the entire 
region of space that they can perceive, holding constant their direction of gaze. The point at 
which the subject’s gaze is focused, at a given moment, defines the visual midline. A subject 
gets the richest and most detailed visual information from the very small region of space 
located around the midline. Everything to the right of the midline falls within the subject’s 
right visual hemifield; everything to the left of the midline falls within the left visual hemifield. 
In this figure, information from the right visual hemifield is represented by shaded symbols 
(squares and circles), and information from the left visual hemifield is represented by unshaded 
symbols (squares and circles). Information from both visual hemifields enters each eye, and 
information from both eyes enters each hemisphere, but information from only a single visual 
hemifield enters each hemisphere (right visual hemifield to the left hemisphere, left visual 
hemifield to the right hemisphere). Normally, the hemispheres share this information via the 
corpus callosum, shown sectioned here. Were the optic chiasm to be sectioned as well, each 
hemisphere would still receive visual information from only a single visual hemifield but would 
also receive visual information from only a single eye.
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Sperry suggested to Myers that he do just this: perform a double surgery, a callosotomy-
chiasmotomy (Evarts, 1990, p. xxi). Myers went to some trouble perfecting the technique 
of sectioning the (very small) optic chiasm (see Gazzaniga, 2015, pp. 42–3). It was this 
double surgery that finally allowed experimenters to present different visual informa-
tion to the two hemispheres.
After the optic chiasm is sectioned, each hemisphere receives visual information 
directly from only the ipsilateral (same-side) eye. After the corpus callosum is sectioned, 
neither hemisphere receives visual information indirectly from the other hemisphere. 
With both the optic chiasm and the corpus callosum sectioned, visual information from 
the left eye is received by only the LH, and visual information from the right eye by 
only the RH. So, in an animal who has undergone sectioning of both the optic chiasm 
and the corpus callosum, a single hemisphere can be rendered effectively blind just by 
placing an eye patch over the ipsilateral eye.
Now the observed “disconnection effects” were striking. Among other things, an 
animal could be trained to make competing visual discriminations with each eye 
(e.g. selecting Os rather than Xs with the left eye open, and Xs rather than Os with the 
right eye open), with no interference effects, as if each eye had its own memory and 
volitional system. But of course no one thought that a mere eye had its own memories, 
much less an independent will. It was rather as if each hemisphere of these split-brain 
animals had its own eye.
Sperry would later be awarded the Nobel Prize for several aspects of his research, 
including his research with split-brain animals and then with human split-brain 
subjects. The latter research he initially collaborated on, at California Institute of 
Technology, with his then PhD student Michael Gazzaniga and with former Caltech 
postdoc and local neurosurgery resident Joseph Bogen. Relatively early on, Sperry—
already eminent as an experimentalist—seems to have begun focusing on the more 
philosophical issues raised by the split-brain phenomenon (Bogen once called him 
“among the deepest, the most profound, neurothinkers” (2006, p. 87)). By comparison, 
the younger Gazzaniga published a mass of experimental works on various aspects of 
split-brain psychology, with Bogen perhaps intermediate between the two in his mix 
of energies and attentions.
2.4. Working with split-brain human beings
The experimental paradigm developed by Myers and Sperry to test split-brain non-
human animals needed to be modified to test human split-brain subjects. (Much of the 
credit for these modifications seems to belong to Gazzaniga, though this is made clear 
not by Gazzaniga himself, in his own recent autobiography (see e.g. Gazzaniga, 2015, 
pp. 42–4), but rather by others, including Bogen, 2006, and Corballis, 2015.)
Epilepsy presents no medical need to section the optic chiasm, and thus a mere eye 
patch will not suffice to lateralize visual input, since each hemisphere receives visual 
information from both eyes. Instead, the various methods that were developed to 
lateralize visual information for human subjects exploit the fact that each hemisphere 
0003423019.INDD   11 4/9/2018   12:32:50 PM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 04/09/2018, SPi
12 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND “SPLIT” BRAINS
directly receives visual information from only one side of the visual field (see Figure 1.2). 
The RH receives visual information from only the left visual hemifield, and the LH 
receives it from only the right visual hemifield (I am simplifying; see Chapter 5).
One interesting requirement of working with human split-brain subjects is the extra 
attention needed to prevent them from engaging in cross-cueing. Cross-cueing is the 
interhemispheric communication of information subserved by the subjects’ own 
movements. Many cross-cueing behaviors are automatically deployed by both human 
split-brain subjects and non-human split-brain animals: for instance, moving one’s 
eyes to fixate on something glanced suddenly to one’s left, thus bringing a portion of it 
into the right visual field also. On the other hand, some cross-cueing behaviors look 
like strategic attempts to circumvent the lateralization of stimuli. Suppose for instance 
that an experimenter wants to learn whether semantic meaning can still transfer 
between the two hemispheres, via some kind of intact non-cortical route. So she 
 presents a word, say, “CAT,” in a split-brain subject’s left hemifield, so that it is sent to 
only his RH, and then asks him to indicate what he saw by naming it, thus using his LH. 
If the experimenter is not careful, the subject might try to use the finger of his left hand, 
controlled by his right hemisphere, to trace the letters “C-A-T” on the back of his right 
hand—which the left hemisphere can feel (Sperry et al., 1979).
The special features of human split-brain experiments are intended to permit 
or  preserve stimulus lateralization and response lateralization. Such lateralization 
allows neuropsychologists to ask questions of and receive answers from each hemi-
sphere individually.
Imagine a split-brain subject, S, visually focusing on some point on a screen marked 
by a dot or a cross. Anything visually presented to the left of this central fixation point 
will be sent directly to his right hemisphere (RH), and anything visually presented to 
the right of this point will be sent directly to his left hemisphere (LH). Now, this is 
also true of subjects who have two cerebral hemispheres and a corpus callosum, such 
as me and (I assume) you—but the corpus callosum of a “non-split” subject allows 
either hemisphere to gain indirect access to the information that only a single hemi-
sphere initially received. In a split-brain subject, however, the information remains 
largely confined to the hemisphere that initially received it.
Suppose for instance that (as described in Sperry, 1968a) two symbols are presented 
onscreen simultaneously: a dollar sign in S’s left visual hemifield and a question mark 
in his right visual hemifield (see Figure 1.3). Once the screen goes blank, you ask S 
what he saw, and he says he saw a question mark on the right. You ask S what was on the 
left and he says he didn’t see anything or that he doesn’t know. But now suppose you 
ask him to close his eyes and you give him a sheet of paper and a pencil to hold in his 
left hand and ask him to draw what he saw on the screen using that hand. S now draws 
the dollar sign, that is, the left-sided stimulus that he said he didn’t see. If his eyes are 
still closed and you ask him what he drew, he says “without hesitation that the figure 
he drew was the question mark, or whatever appeared in the right half of the field” 
(Sperry, 1968a, p. 726). S is not crazy or blind, and once you allow him to open his eyes 
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Anything on the le?
Okay....
In a moment, a ‘+’ sign will come up on a screen in front of
you. Once you look at the ‘+’,  an image or images will
come up, to the left, to the right, or on both sides of the
‘+’. Please keep your eyes on the ‘+’ until the screen goes
blank. Then I will ask you what you saw. Okay?
Okay...
Okay. How about you close your eyes,
and keep them closed until I say to
open them. I’m putting a pencil in
your le hand. Please use your le
hand to draw what you saw. $ +
+ ?
No, I didn’t see
anything on the le.
+ ?
$
$
+ ?
?
What did you see?
I saw a question
mark on the right.
+ ?
Please keep your eyes
closed for a little
longer. What did you
draw?
A question mark.
Okay now open your eyes...
So what do you think
was on the le side
of the screen?
A dollar sign,
I guess.
....What did you draw?
Okay.... $ + ?
A dollar sign!
Figure 1.3 A split-brain experiment. Figure depicting a common split-brain experiment design 
type, with prototypical results (illustrating an experiment described in Sperry, 1968a). The sec-
ond panel shows the subject seated in front of a screen. The “+” sign represents the central 
fixation point on which the subject’s gaze is focused, defining the midline of the subject’s visual 
field. In this experiment a “$” is presented in the left visual hemifield and a “?” in the right 
visual hemifield. When the subject is asked to indicate verbally what he saw, he names the “?” 
that was presented in the visual hemifield of the LH, which in this subject also controls speech. 
When the subject is asked to draw what he saw using the left hand, the subject draws the “$,” 
which was presented in the visual hemifield of the RH, whose dominant hand is the left hand.
Source: illustration by Pippin Schupbach, with permission.
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he quickly corrects himself: it’s a dollar sign on the sheet of paper, not a question mark. 
But he may say that he doesn’t know why he drew it, or that he drew it by mistake—
though if you ask him whether it might thus have been a dollar sign on the left side 
of the screen, he admits that it might.
Here is as uncontroversial an explanation of the subject’s behavior as I can give. The 
dollar sign presented on the left was received by S’s RH exclusively, while the question 
mark presented on the right was received by S’s LH exclusively. Very often in split-brain 
subjects—and let’s assume so in S—spoken language cannot be generated out of the 
RH. So when S stated what he’d seen, production of the statement originated in the 
LH, which had received no visual information about the dollar sign, so S mentioned 
only the question mark. But the RH receives visual information from the left side of 
visual space and (typically) exerts dominant motor control over the left hand. So when 
S used his left hand to draw what he’d seen, production of the drawing behavior ori-
ginated in his RH, which had received visual information about the dollar sign. But the 
LH apparently lacks access to the RH intentions causally responsible for the drawing, 
so, prior to being allowed to look at the drawing, S’s statement about what he drew 
originated in a hemisphere that still hadn’t received any information about a dollar 
sign: S’s left hemisphere. Once S was allowed to look at the drawing, however, his LH 
finally received visual information about the dollar sign on the sheet of paper, and so S 
could now provide a correct verbal identification of the symbol originally presented on 
the left side of the screen.
This explanation traces the causal flow of information into and through and back 
out of the brain more than once: from onscreen stimulus into the RH and from the RH 
to an action that produces a new stimulus in the form of the dollar sign on the sheet of 
paper, and then back into the brain, this time the LH. This kind of information flow 
story crucially relies upon hypotheses about the architecture of perception and the 
control of action in the brain, hypotheses supported by a range of evidence, including, 
at this point, the split-brain literature itself.
Here is a second explanation of the same behavior. S’s right hemisphere saw the 
dollar sign, but the RH can’t speak, and the left hemisphere, which can speak, saw only 
the question mark, and so that is all the LH at first mentioned. The RH can use the left 
hand, however, and so drew the dollar sign that it saw. But the LH didn’t at first know 
what the RH had drawn and therefore understandably assumed that the drawing was 
of the question mark the LH had seen. When finally allowed to see the sheet of paper, 
however, the subject was startled. Or at least, his left hemisphere was startled; his right 
hemisphere presumably knew what it had drawn.
The first story sounds unobjectionable from a philosophical standpoint. The second 
is highly controversial. What I will call the unity debates about the split-brain cases 
center on the question of whether the second explanation offers an accurate way of 
conceptualizing the activities of the two hemisphere systems after split-brain surgery, 
or whether it is just a shamelessly anthropomorphic shorthand for a much subtler 
psychological reality.
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In other words: can a mere hemisphere really see? Speak? Feel startled? Know what 
it has done?
3. The Unity Debates
No other neurological condition has attracted the same multidisciplinary attention. 
By  the mid 1990s (at which time Ornstein, 1997, estimated that there had already 
been about 45,000 psychological and biomedical papers published on the split-brain 
phenomenon), “split-brain ideas [had] spilled over into academic fields in both the 
sciences and the humanities, from cognitive and developmental psychology, clinical 
psychology, anthropology, archeology, and even paleontology, to education, philosophy, 
religious studies, and theology” (Wald, 2008, p. 36).
Why? Well, for one thing, the plain isomorphism between putative mental and neural 
structure in the split-brain case offered a particularly vivid symbol of materialism: it’s 
one thing to know that taking a hammer to a man’s head damages him psychologically 
and another to believe that dividing his brain at the cortical level somehow divides 
him into two psychological beings. By this point, the secular academy had achieved 
confident consensus on materialism anyway, but anti-materialist theologians and 
Christian philosophers still took on the split-brain phenomenon as a “hard case.” 
Michael Gazzaniga once relayed this anecdote: Sperry went to the Vatican to give an 
impassioned speech on the necessity of integrating science and the study of values for 
the survival and flourishing of humankind—and yet it seemed (to Sperry’s slight frus-
tration) that all the questions from the holy audience concerned his relatively brief 
mention of the split-brain cases.1
Within philosophy, the so-called “split-brain phenomenon” would ultimately be 
invoked to argue for everything from the virtues of a Kantian moral framework 
(Korsgaard, 1989) to the coherence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity (Merricks, 
2006). But a main reason for the philosophical interest of split-brain cases is that they 
appeared to raise the old specter of self-blindness in a contemporary context: that of 
the growing predominance of scientific perspectives on human beings. In the first 
philosophical article devoted to the split-brain cases (though they figure also in 
Parfit, 1971), Nagel used them to highlight what he saw as a growing tension between 
our ordinary ways of understanding people and the understanding of human beings 
“as physical systems” emerging from the developing sciences of the mind/brain 
(Nagel, 1971, p. 396).
This was in part a tension between disciplines. Despite the diversity within each 
group, philosophers and neuropsychologists generally tended toward different inter-
pretations of the split-brain phenomenon. Many neuropsychologists seemed to accept, 
implicitly or explicitly, what I will call the 2-thinkers claim. Philosophers, as always, 
showed little convergence, but perhaps most expressed skepticism. Some more or less 
1 M. Gazzaniga, personal communication, January 10, 2013.
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explicitly accused neuropsychologists of running away with the data (Rigterink, 1980, 
pp. 449–50). To this, some neuropsychologists retorted that they, at least, had had “direct 
contact with the data” (Bogen, 1977, p. 282)—that is, presumably, with the split-brain 
subjects themselves.
At a deeper level, however, the tension the split-brain cases evoked was intrapsychic: 
they served as a focal point for a felt tension between two divergent and potentially 
incompatible perspectives on human life and human nature (Erdmann and Stover, 1991).
They evoked this tension first and foremost because the subjects themselves did not 
feel psychically split; neuropsychologists, with their ingenious experiments, seemed 
to adopt or assume a perspective on the subjects that the subjects themselves lacked. 
Worse yet, it was said that outside the lab, split-brain people were indistinguishable 
from anyone else. If scientific work could nonetheless reveal that each of them is merely 
a composite of multiple psychological beings, whose identity might the lab coats come 
for next?
Philosophical discussion of the split-brain cases has overwhelmingly concerned the 
topic of psychological identity, that is, of personal identity broadly construed, since 
philosophers have debated not just how many persons there are within or associated 
with a split-brain subject, but also how many minds and subjects of experience. 
Presumably, split-brain subjects are unitary qua animals (even if animals’ psycho-
logical capacities are essential to their identities as animals; Maiese, 2016). But human 
beings are not unitary qua animals only; we are also, we suppose, unitary qua persons, 
qua responsible agents, minds or thinkers, self-knowers, subjects of experience, and 
so on. What I will call the “how many?” questions are questions such as: How many 
subjects of experience is a split-brain subject? How many intentional agents? How 
many persons?
As a group, philosophers and neuropsychologists would come to defend every one of 
the possible answers that Nagel (1971) laid out: that a split-brain subject has one mind 
vulnerable to conscious dissociations, or two conscious minds, or two minds at some 
times and one mind at others, and so on. Nagel himself ultimately concluded only that 
all such conclusions were “unacceptable for one reason or another” (1971, p. 403).
In other words, the split-brain phenomenon presents a puzzle: a question to which 
“every imaginable answer seems wrong” (Pietroski, 2000, p. 13). The question is some-
thing like this: how many of us is a split-brain subject? If the question seems vague or 
indeterminate—who and what are we, anyway?—then that is just a part of the problem.
I will call this the unity puzzle. It arises from two intuitions about the split-brain 
cases in particular plus a background assumption about persons generally. The first 
intuition is that a split-brain subject has two minds, or rather that each hemisphere has 
its own mind. The second intuition is that a split-brain subject is nonetheless a unitary 
(single) person.
These intuitions are in tension only against the background of some idea or 
assumption linking the unity of the person to the unity of mind. I will call this the 
“one mind per person” (1-mind/person) rule. It’s in the background insofar as it is not 
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explicit in ordinary understanding or social interaction but nonetheless presup-
posed by much or all of it. When someone voices their decision, you don’t typically 
expect or ask to hear a  second, different decision voiced from the same mouth, and 
if you do hear one, you assume that the first decision has been reversed, that one 
thinker changed his mind or her mind, singular. Or if, at time t1, you attribute an 
intention to someone and then at t2 see them act inconsistently with that intention, 
you assume either that you were wrong at t1 about what they even then intended to 
do or that although you were right at t1, something changed by t2. You do not 
assume—as another possibility, on equal footing with either of these—that one 
thinker or agent within the human being did indeed intend at t1 what you believed 
them to intend and that the t2 action was the action of a second thinker or agent who 
had different intentions even at t1. Or if a friend promises something, you make a 
global judgment about how likely she is to honor that promise, and you don’t need to 
make separate judgments about two beings somehow within or associated with your 
friend, one of whom always keeps her word and the other of whom never does. Or 
you delight that your friend is deservedly proud of his recent accomplishment, with-
out worrying that—as he has some deep-seated insecurities—he may now become 
jealous and resentful of himself.
The unity puzzle thus consists of this inconsistent triad:
The duality intuition: A split-brain subject has two minds.
The unity intuition: A split-brain subject is one person.
The one mind per person (1-mind/person) rule: Each person has exactly one mind.
On the one hand, each member of the triad is independently appealing. On the other 
hand, they can’t all be true.
Philosophers have usually responded by offering illusion accounts  of the split-brain 
phenomenon, which preserve the 1-mind/person rule by rejecting either the unity 
intuition or the duality intuition as illusory. Relatively few philosophers have offered a 
reconciliation account, according to which both the duality intuition (two minds) and 
the unity intuition (one person) are true. It is this latter sort of account that is offered in 
this book.
Reconciliation accounts are prima facie less appealing. Although reconciling 
apparently conflicting intuitions is nice when you can get it, it often comes at too high 
a price, since it requires making changes to the larger background against which 
such intuitions are in conflict. Why not think that the 1-mind/person rule is the worst 
possible place to make changes? At least the unity and duality intuitions only explicitly 
concern split-brain subjects—a special and a small population—while the 1-mind/
person rule governs our understanding of persons generally. As Pietroski points out, 
“I want not just any coherent set of beliefs, but a coherent set of beliefs that is recogniz-
ably mine” (Pietroski, 2000, p. 17; original emphasis). There is no point in resolving the 
split-brain unity puzzle only by offering an account of personhood that is so radically 
unfamiliar that I myself cannot accept it.
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My approach therefore won’t be to develop a new way for us to think about persons 
but to try to bring to light certain things that we already on some level accept. I will in 
part appeal to certain empirical facts about split-brain psychology that have gone under-
examined in the philosophical literature on the phenomenon and that I hope will explain 
how the 1-mind/person rule admits of at least this one exception. While potentially 
unique, the exception is nonetheless made possible by more general features of persons 
and of our psychologies: by complex social practices designed to meet needs under 
perpetual threat, by the resources that enable these practices, and by the assump-
tions that undergird them. The strategy, then, isn’t simply to reject the 1-mind/person 
rule but to contextualize it, thereby showing that its violation in the case of some rare 
individuals does not threaten the substance of our basic ways of thinking about human 
beings as psychological beings.
4. Outline of Book
Here is how the rest of the book will go.
Chapter 2 presents the case for thinking that a split-brain subject has two subjective 
perspectives. This 2-perspectives claim is entailed by three others: that there are elements 
of experience associated with both the right hemisphere and the left hemisphere, that 
these elements are unified intrahemispherically, and that they are disunified interhemi-
spherically. Chapter 2 also rejects challenges to the interhemispheric disunity claim, 
and explains why the truth of the 2-perspectives claim suggests that the two hemispheres 
are associated with distinct subjects of experience, whom I call R and L.
Because of the close connections between consciousness and agency, the truth of 
this latter 2-subjects claim ultimately depends upon it being the case that R and L are 
distinct intentional agents. Chapter 3 defends this 2-agents claim, and explains why it is 
consistent with what we know about split-brain subjects’ behavior even outside of 
experimental conditions, in their daily lives.
Chapter 4 generalizes the defense of the 2-subjects and 2-agents claims, explaining 
who R and L are, and how there could be two distinct psychological beings, two 
thinkers, co-embodied as one human being. What is puzzling about the 2-thinkers claim 
is that R’s mental states interact with L’s richly and perpetually. The argument for the 
2-thinkers claim therefore appeals to different kinds of psychic interaction and inde-
pendence and especially to what I call the distinction between direct versus indirect 
mental state interaction. What evokes the various duality intuitions are cases in which 
R’s mental states seem able to interact with L’s only indirectly. Chapter 4 explains why 
this distinction matters to the individuation of thinkers.
Chapter 5 concerns the major objection to the 2-thinkers claim, the objection from 
sub-cortical structures, according to which split-brain psychology is ultimately not 
substantially divided by split-brain surgery. Chapter 5 argues that remaining direct 
interhemispheric interaction is neither substantial nor the primary source of what 
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unity and normalcy we see in split-brain subjects’ behavior. The best account of 
split-brain psychology is thus still one according to which a split-brain subject is 
two  distinct psychological beings, albeit beings that are neither physically nor 
 psychologically discrete.
Several philosophers have presented arguments to the effect that if the duality claims 
are true of split-brain subjects, then they must be true of non-split subjects also, since 
we are all unitary human beings with two cerebral hemispheres. Chapter 6 responds to 
and rejects these arguments, and then presents the kind of psychological commonality 
between non-split and split-brain subjects that is secured by the unity of the body.
Chapter 7 turns to self-consciousness in split-brain subjects, arguing that R and L 
are not just distinct thinkers but distinct thinkers of I-thoughts in particular. In this 
sense, self-consciousness is dual in split-brain subjects. On the other hand, split-brain 
self-consciousness operates in such a way as to make R and L very different from other 
pairs of self-conscious thinkers. This will become the basis of Chapter 8’s argument 
that R and L are not distinct persons but are instead mere parts of one person. Chapter 9 
turns again to the relationship between the split-brain and the non-split case, and in 
particular to the question of why the split-brain cases garnered so much interest and 
attention even from non-academic quarters. There I offer a different explanation from 
the one standardly offered—including in Section 3 of this chapter.
5. On Paths Not Taken
Before continuing on to defend the duality intuition in the next chapters, I want to say 
something about the book’s central framing device: as concerning psychological 
identity, the individuation of psychological beings. This approach is traditional, but 
some might view it as outdated, or naïve—perhaps willfully so, since I myself will 
acknowledge in Chapter 5 that RH and LH mental states interact in some ways that make 
it prima facie problematic to think of them as belonging to distinct conscious minds.
So why bother?
After all, we have other options. We could pursue a 1-thinker account, and see what 
sense we can make of a split-brain subject, S, having one mind that incorporates both 
RH and LH activities, even though they don’t seem to operate, interhemispherically, in 
the ways that the activities of a single mind ordinarily do. Or we could seek the nearest 
exit, as it were, and take a deflationary attitude towards the “how many?” questions, one 
that assumes that the psychological identities of split-brain subjects are metaphysically 
indeterminate.
Maintaining that a split-brain subject has one mind has the advantage of conserv-
ativism—a virtue in a philosophical account of psychological identity, as I have said. 
It could be viewed as a curious and open-minded conservatism at that, one ready to be 
enlightened about the potentially sui generis form that the unity of mind takes in this 
particular instance.
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It would be worthwhile to try to develop a 1-thinker account that was fully consistent 
with the empirical extent of mental division in split-brain subjects. Perhaps such an 
account would appeal to some kind of unified meta-cognitive access that wasn’t access 
to specific or detailed contents, an account according to which S remains a single 
thinker in respect of having a preserved sense of how to orient herself and respond to 
goings-on in the world despite limited information, or in respect of being able to 
continually mine the contents of her own mind for increasingly elaborated information, 
slowly exposing both RH and LH contents to the air of full-blown, cognitively accessible 
conscious experience.
The ultimate possibilities for such an account are not clear in advance. The basic risk 
is that no matter how intellectually honest its development, it will inevitably mislead 
on the feature of split-brain psychology that makes it uniquely puzzling: that it involves 
not disunity or even simply partial unity but two unities. Granted, these two unities are 
themselves partially unified with each other. But this is a slim pass between two moun-
tains. The picture of S as mining the contents of her own mind for increasingly elabor-
ated information is always only one half of the picture, for the elaborated information 
is in fact already present to another consciousness. A 2-thinkers account is in this way 
more faithful to the large-scale structure of split-brain psychology.
The deflationary account meanwhile gets one big thing right: no split-brain subject 
offers a perfectly clear-cut instance of “two minds in one body.” The subjects rather 
occupy points intermediate between the ideal case of two thinkers in one body and the 
ordinary case of one thinking animal.
I say that they occupy points, plural, because in fact split-brain subjects differ from 
each other with respect to their degrees of interhemispheric dissociation and integra-
tion.2 The duality claims defended in the first half of the book may thus not be true of 
N.G., for instance, in whom hemispheric independence has always been less striking, 
though she is still far from a non-split subject in this respect, insofar as she does show 
certain systematic dissociations characteristic of the callosal disconnection syndrome. 
And there are a number of split-brain subjects about whom we simply know very little. 
I therefore make no claims about how representative different split-brain subjects are 
of either the non-split population or of the split-brain population (Myers, 1984). I’m 
interested in the possibility of one person with multiple minds. Even a single actual case 
would suffice. As it happens, however, I believe that the 2-thinkers claim is true of 
at  least P.S., V.P. (also known as P.O.V. or C.Z.), J.W., L.B., and most likely C.K. Of 
course, even they differ from each other; for instance, L.B. is probably not as “dual” qua 
2 Many of these differences are believed to be the consequence of brain injuries suffered prior to surgery; 
some may be the consequence of unintentional but inevitable differences between the surgeries themselves; 
for the most part, they are unexplained. Interestingly, the differences extend to the bilateral coherence of 
resting state activity; compare Johnston et al. (2008) and Brázdil et al. (1997) to Uddin et al. (2008). Note 
that Uddin et al. used the split-brain subject N.G., of whom the 2-thinkers claim does not seem to be true. 
(See also Paul and Tyszka, 2012, and O’Reilly et al., 2012.)
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thinker as were P.S. and J.W. (as noted by Seymour et al., 1994). Like them, however, he 
is closer to the “two minds” end of the spectrum.
Still, if there is any sort of a spectrum whatsoever, doesn’t this show that the “how 
many minds?” question requires a false presupposition? A deflationary attitude toward 
the unity debates may seem particularly appealing. It seems to be the most intellec-
tually brave, forsaking the childish comfort of whole-number-countable minds. It 
also seems to be the least dogmatic, most willing to accept (surgically modified) nature 
as it comes (Lockwood, 1989). There is plenty to debate even in a purely empirical 
study of split-brain psychology; however those debates turn out, why not simply leave 
it at “one human being that is in some ways psychologically unified and in other ways 
psychologically divided or dual”?
One reason is that I’m not sure that we can leave it there. We can of course refrain 
from saying anything further, but that does not mean we could maintain this neutrality 
in our own minds. It may be that we cannot help but assign psychological phenomena 
to psychological beings, conceived robustly enough to make a difference to our down-
stream understanding. If this suspicion is right, then even if we ceased to speak of how 
many minds a split-brain subject has— preferring vaguer formulations of the sort that 
I myself will employ in Chapters 2 and 3, like that of experiences “associated with” or 
actions “originating in” one hemisphere or the other—we would nonetheless inevit-
ably think either of S or of the two hemisphere systems as minds, and which way we 
thought of them would color how we understood split-brain psychology. In other 
words, an ostensibly deflationary answer to the “how many minds?” question risks 
implicitly collapsing into either a 1-thinker or a 2-thinkers account after all. If this is 
right, then it may be better to be explicit and self-conscious about how we are concep-
tualizing the domain, while acknowledging that we do so provisionally and fallibly.
A more basic concern about the deflationary position is that it may discourage us 
from taking a hard and detailed look at the empirical literature. This may seem 
implausible, and it would certainly be ironic: the possibility of metaphysically inde-
terminate cases is entailed by reductionism about psychological beings, and reduc-
tionism ought to encourage focus on particular forms and mechanisms and degrees 
of unity and disunity, since at the end of the day that is all there is, if reductionism is 
true. And maybe at the end of looking closely we will decide that the “how many?” 
questions have no answers. It is not a very inspiring place to start, however. There 
may be lumpers and splitters, but even splitters need a unifying picture, if only to 
have something to pick apart.
This is a concern about pursuing a deflationary account, not a criticism of the 
position itself. A deflationary attitude toward the “how many minds?” question is 
not equivalent to an “it’s all just a giant mess” dismissiveness. My own sense, however, 
has been that too often the latter is what the former seems to inspire. And there is so 
much not to dismiss here that it is worth trying to forge an order from it, whether or 
not the attempt succeeds.
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After all, imagination outstrips reality in some ways—but sometimes it’s the 
other way around. Even if my account of split-brain psychological identity should 
turn out to be a castle in the air, it will have been built from real and important 
materials, ones that could be made to serve other philosophical purposes. The 
materials are different kinds of psychic unity and disunity, and, as the reductionist 
says, they are what we are.
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